Abstract-This study examines a setting in which a tax reporting decision is delegated to a …rm's tax manager. The use of …nancial accounting measures of tax expense arises endogenously as an e¢ cient way of providing contemporaneous incentives to the manager when the consequences of the tax reporting decision will occur in the future.
Introduction
The …nancial accounting consequences of tax reporting decisions are of …rst-order importance. Numerous papers have documented the importance of the e¤ect of a tax reporting decision on a …rm's …nancial accounting earnings in understanding …rm behavior, as reviewed by Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) . The reason why …rms focus on the …nancial accounting consequences instead of the cash ‡ow consequences of tax reporting decisions is a puzzle that we explore in this paper.
We examine a setting in which a …rm delegates the task of identifying and evaluating tax return reporting positions to a tax manager. The …rm can take a tax reporting position that would reduce its current taxes, but later may be audited by the tax authority. The manager can identify and learn the degree to which the facts and the law support a tax reporting position by exerting unobservable costly e¤ort. We …rst analyze an agency model in which the …rm must provide incentives to the manager to work in order to identify and evaluate tax reporting positions, and then use the information in the way the …rm prefers. This requires a delicate balancing of incentives, so that the manager both works and takes the reporting position that the …rm would prefer if it had the information.
In our model, there may be strong, weak, or no support for a tax reporting position. All …rms want to take positions with strong support; no …rm wants to take positions with no support. We distinguish two types of reporting strategies when the support is weak. Firms that prefer to take the position if the facts are weak are aggressive; …rms that prefer to not take the position when facts are weak are conservative. If managerial e¤ort were observable, both the …rm and the manager would only care about the current and future cash taxes paid and the cost of the manager's e¤ort. However, because the manager's e¤orts to research the issue to determine the likelihood of success in case of a future audit cannot be observed, the manager must be given contemporaneous incentives to both engage in costly e¤ort and make the tax reporting decision that the …rm prefers. We show that, both for the aggressive and for the conservative …rm, the manager's optimal compensation features a bonus for a taking a reporting position that reduces the …rm's income tax expense for …nancial reporting purposes, but imposes a penalty for generating an unrecognized tax bene…t. This combination of bonus and penalty provides the manager with incentives to acquire information, avoid tax positions with little chance of being sustained upon audit, and claim uncertain tax bene…ts that are likely to be sustained upon audit. The aggressive …rm can have a smaller penalty in its optimal contract because it only wants to deter the manager from taking aggressive tax positions that have zero support, whereas the conservative …rm wants to deter the manager from taking aggressive tax positions unless they have strong support.
Our results show that basing the manager's compensation on current …nancial accounting measures of tax expense and unrecognized tax bene…ts is su¢ cient to motivate the manager to identify and evaluate tax-saving reporting positions, and choose the tax reporting position that the …rm would make if it had the information.
Therefore, a desire on the part of the manager to achieve lower current book tax expense, as opposed to lower current cash taxes paid, arises endogenously in our setting as a solution to the manager's moral hazard problem.
We then extend our analysis to examine the relation between a …rm's tax aggressiveness and three accounting measures -cash taxes paid, book income tax expense, and the unrecognized tax bene…t. A …rm's book income tax expense is often normalized by its pretax …nancial accounting income to yield an e¤ective tax rate (ETR). Originally proposed by Surrey (1973) , the ETR is a common measure of the extent to which activities are taxed in a favorable manner. The e¤ective tax rate has been used as a measure of tax planning e¤ectiveness. Surveys suggest that the most important objective of corporate tax departments and their advisors has become reducing a …rm's e¤ective tax rate (Clark, Martire & Bartolomeo, Inc. 2000;  Manufacturers Alliance 1998). Mintz (1999) uses a …rm's e¤ective tax rate as a measure of tax planning e¢ ciency in his "Tax E¢ ciency Scoreboard." Academic research has used the ETR as a measure of a …rm's tax planning e¤ectiveness. Mills et al. (1998) uses a …rm's ETR as a measure of tax planning e¤ectiveness in their study of the returns to investments in tax planning. Phillips (2003) uses the ETR as a tax planning e¤ectiveness measure in his study of motivating managers using after-tax performance measures. Rego (2003) uses the ETR to examine the relation between a …rm's size, extent of multinational activities, and tax planning e¤ectiveness. Robinson, Sikes and Weaver (2010) and Armstrong, Blouin and Larcker (2010) report that reductions in the ETR, not reduction in cash taxes paid, are the basis on which tax directors are evaluated.
A variation of the e¤ective tax rate is the cash ETR, in which cash taxes paid replace book income tax expense in the numerator. Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2008) use the cash ETR measured over a ten-year period as their measure of corporate tax avoidance.
The third measure of tax aggressiveness we examine is the …rm's unrecognized tax bene…t (UTB). Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) Interpretation No.
48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (FIN 48), provides rules for recognizing a tax bene…t in current accounting earnings even though that bene…t could be lost (in whole or in part) due to a subsequent audit. Although claiming the tax bene…t reduces the …rm's taxes paid when the tax return is …led, FIN 48 provides rules under which uncertain tax bene…ts either reduce the …rm's tax expense for …nancial accounting purposes or create a liability, called the unrecognized tax bene…t.
Paragraph 21(a)(2) of FIN 48 requires that …rms disclose the unrecognized tax bene…ts that arise as a result of tax positions taken during the current period. Cazier et al. (2009) and Dunbar and Schultz (2009) examine the levels and changes in …rm's unrecognized tax bene…ts. Lisowsky, Robinson and Schmidt (2010) examine the exent to which participation in a tax shelter is re ‡ected in an increase in the …rm's unrecognized tax bene…t.
We show that the three measures-a reduction in cash taxes paid, a reduction in book tax expense, and an increase in the unrecognized tax bene…t-can be ranked in terms of how likely they are to correctly distinguish between an aggressive …rm and a conservative …rm. The reduction in book tax expense is always a less sensitive measure than current taxes paid, because what distinguishes aggressive …rms from conservative …rms is that they will also take positions with weak facts. Although taking a position with weak support always leads to a decrease in current taxes paid, it does not lead to a decrease in book tax expense when the position is recorded in accordance with FIN 48. In contrast, the increase in the unrecognized tax bene…t is the most sensitive measure if compliance with FIN 48 is high. The reason is that an aggressive …rm that took a position with weak support and records an unrecognized tax bene…t in accordance with FIN48 has a higher unrecognized tax bene…t than a conservative …rm that took a position with strong support. The two …rms, however, would have the same reduction in cash taxes paid because they both took the position. Reduction in cash taxes paid is in this case less sensitive to the …rm's tax aggressiveness than is the increase in the unrecognized tax bene…t, but is always more sensitive than is than is the reduction in book tax expense. However, if compliance with FIN 48 is low, the unrecognized tax bene…t is the least sensitive of the three measures.
We present the model in Section 2. In section 3 we characterize an e¢ cient compensation contract for the tax manager of a conservative and an aggressive …rm, respectively. Section 4 examines measures of tax planning aggressiveness. Section 5 concludes.
Model

Tax reporting decision
Firm i has an opportunity to reduce its current taxes paid by V i by taking tax return reporting positions that reduce taxes, but that may be challenged by the tax authority.
For expositional convenience only, we normalize V i to one in the next two sections of the paper, so all monetary values should be interpreted as being per dollar of tax bene…t available. There can be strong, weak, or zero facts supporting the position. We 
If = w; then the taxpayer retains e x(w); a random variable with realizations from the interval [0; 1]: In addition, the taxpayer incurs a negligence penalty e (w). We assume that the expected negligence penalty is su¢ ciently large that the taxpayer's expected payo¤ is negative when it claims the tax bene…t, the facts are weak, and the taxpayer is audited, i.e.,
This assumption ensures that negligence penalties have some deterrent e¤ect because a taxpayer who knows that the facts are weak prefers not to take the position if the audit probability is su¢ ciently high. Finally, if = z; then the taxpayer retains e x(z); a random variable with realizations from the interval [0; 1]: In addition, the taxpayer incurs a negligence penalty e (z). We assume that the expected negligence penalty when = z is su¢ ciently large that even the taxpayer facing the lowest audit probability prefers not to take a position when it has zero support, i.e.,
We let & denote the probability that there is zero support.
The …rm delegates the task of identifying and evaluating the possible tax return reporting position to a tax manager who learns the realization of . This allows the manager to condition the …rm's tax reporting decision on the realization of .
Because e x(s) is always positive, all …rms prefer to take tax reporting positions with strong facts, regardless of their audit probabilities. Similarly, no …rm prefers to take the tax reporting position with zero support. In contrast, because E[e x(w) e (w)] < 0, only …rms with su¢ ciently low audit probabilities want to take the position when the facts are weak. Speci…cally, …rm i wants to claim the tax bene…t if and only if
We de…ne a …rm as aggressive if the above condition is satis…ed, and conservative otherwise. The conservative …rm only wants to take tax reporting positions that will not incur negligence penalties. The aggressive …rm is willing to take positions that could result in negligence penalties. We emphasize that the labels conservative and aggressive do not represent intrinsic …rm characteristics, but simply re ‡ect the economic incentives that the …rm faces, given the expected audit probability i .
Tax manager compensation
The …rm delegates the task of identifying and evaluating a tax-saving reporting position to a tax manager. The manager can identify and evaluate the positions at a personal cost c > 0; if the manager does not engage in costly e¤ort, no tax-saving reporting positions are identi…ed. The …rm must pay the tax manager enough to compensate him for the cost of e¤ort, so that the manager identi…es and evaluates tax-saving reporting positions, and to provide incentives to the manager to make the tax reporting decision that is best for the …rm, i.e., take the position if the (aggressive or conservative) …rm prefers the position to be taken. requires that the …rm records a liability for …nancial reporting purposes for an unrecognized tax bene…t to account for the possibility that the tax bene…t could be lost (in whole or in part) due to a subsequent audit. We let BT E represent the reduction in book tax expense that the …rm should recognize in its current accounting earnings under FIN 48, and let U T B represent the unrecognized tax bene…t. If the …rm did not take the position (i.e., T = 0), then U T B = BT E = 0; if the …rm took the position (i.e., T = 1), then U T B = 1 BT E.
Financial reporting
FIN 48 determines the amount of the uncertain tax bene…t the taxpayer may recognize as a reduction in book tax expense when the tax return is …led by applying a two-step process: recognition and measurement. In the recognition step, taxpayers may only recognize tax bene…ts that are more than 50 percent likely to be sustained by the court of last resort based solely on the technical merits of the …ling position.
We assume that the …rm's position passes the recognition step when the facts are strong, and does not pass the recognition step when the facts are weak or when there is zero support. Therefore, if 2 fw; zg, BT E = 0 if the …rm's …nancial statements conform to FIN 48.
If the taxpayer learns that the position is strong, = s; the measurement step then determines the amount of the tax bene…t that should be recognized in the …rm's …nancial statements. The tax bene…t recognized in the …nancial statements is the largest tax bene…t that cumulatively is greater than 50 percent likely to be sustained on audit, taking into account likely settlements with the government, assuming that the position is audited. This means that the …rm should recognize under FIN 48 as a current period reduction in tax expense the value m that solves
where f s (x) is the density function ofx(s), the fraction of the tax bene…t that the taxpayer retains if audited and the facts are strong, i.e., = s: We allow f s (x) to have a mass point at x = 1, which implies that there is a positive probability that the taxpayer retains the full tax bene…t claimed. If the probability that x = 1 is higher than 50%, then m = 1; otherwise, 0 < m < 1. We emphasize that the expected tax bene…t that the taxpayer will retain is
which re ‡ects the audit probability i and the mean value of e x(s) instead of its median value. The expected tax bene…t can deviate substantially from the tax bene…t recognized in the …nancial statements for two reasons. First, the recognized bene…t does not account for the possibility that the tax authority will not audit the position.
Second, the recognized tax bene…t re ‡ects the median outcome, not the mean outcome.
FIN 48 requires the taxpayer to recognize a liability for the unrecognized tax bene…t to o¤set some or all of the total tax bene…t claimed on the tax return. Because the recognized bene…t is the median value of the taxpayer's retained tax bene…t (the more likely than not amount), the unrecognized tax bene…t 1 BT E should be one when 2 fw; zg and should be 1 m when = s.
Although we allow perfect compliance with FIN 48 as a special case, we consider the more general case in which the reporting and auditing processes are imperfect. We allow for the possibility that the …rm that is aggressive for tax reporting purposes is able to mimic the …nancial reporting of a conservative …rm that only takes positions with strong facts. First, we assume that a …rm that took a weak position ( = w) is able to recognize a reduction in book tax expense of BT E = m with probability " < 1, even though that is not in accordance with FIN 48. With probability 1 ", the …rm reports a reduction in book tax expense of BT E = 0 in accordance with FIN 48.
Similarly, we assume that a …rm that took a position with zero support ( = z) is able to recognize a book tax expense of BT E = m with probability < ". 1 With probability 1 , the …rm reports a reduction in book tax expense of BT E = 0. We interpret " and as measures of …nancial reporting quality, as they measure the extent to which a …rm that takes a position with weak facts or zero support is able to mimic the …nancial reporting of a …rm that took a strong position. Perfect compliance with FIN 48 corresponds to the special case where " = = 0. Table 1 summarizes the probabilities of the two possible …nancial reporting outcomes, conditional on the position being taken, i.e., T = 1. We denote = F for the favorable outcome that reduces book tax expense (i.e., BT E = m; U T B = 1 m), and = U for the unfavorable outcome in which book tax expense is una¤ected (i.e.,
BT E = 0; U T B = 1). Table 1 3 Accounting measures of tax manager performance
The contracting problem
The …rm cannot observe the manager taking the costly action and choosing the tax return position that the …rm prefers. Instead, the …rm must design a contract that induces the manager to work to identify and evaluate the tax reporting opportunity and make the decision that the …rm prefers. If the …rm could wait until either the tax position is audited or the statute of limitations expires to compensate the manager, then a contract that induces the preferred actions could be written on the basis of the eventual cash ‡ows. Given the length of time between when a tax return is …led and the statute of limitations has expired, this approach is impractical. We seek a contract that is based on current …nancial accounting information, which in this case is BT E; the reduction in book tax expense that is re ‡ected in current accounting earnings, and U T B, the unrecognized tax bene…t.
Given the FIN 48 reporting rules, there are three states of the world on which the …rm and the manager can contract. First, the manager might not claim the tax bene…t, T = 0. In this case, BT E = 0 and U T B = 0. If this outcome occurs, the …rm agrees to pay the manager y 0 . Second, the manager might claim the tax bene…t, T = 1; and the …rm's audited …nancial statements show BT E = 0, so U T B = 1. If this outcome occurs, the …rm agrees to pay the manager y 1 : Finally, the manager might choose T = 1 and the …rm's audited …nancial statements show BT E = m, so the unrecognized tax bene…t is 1 m: If this outcome occurs, the …rm agrees to pay the manager y m : We note that salary payments y 1 and y m are each associated with the same level of cash taxes paid; they di¤er only with respect to the way the reduction in cash taxes paid is re ‡ected in the …rm's accounting earnings.
Both the manager and the …rm are risk-neutral. The manager chooses the actions to maximize the expected salary less the cost of e¤ort. The …rm designs a contract that minimizes its expected salary payments given that the contract induces the manager to engage in costly e¤ort and make the tax planning choice that the …rm prefers.
The optimal contract o¤ered by the conservative …rm solves the following program.
(1 )y 0 + y m c 0 (P C)
(1 )y 0 + y m c y 0 (IC1)
The participation constraint (P C) ensures that the contract provides an expected payo¤ that is at least as high as the manager's cost of e¤ort. 2 The four incentive compatibility constraints provide the manager with the incentives to work hard to identify and evaluate the tax reporting opportunities and to use the information to make the decision that the …rm prefers. IC1 ensures that the expected payo¤ is as least as high as the payo¤ the manager could get from not working; not working ensures that no tax reporting opportunities are identi…ed, in which case the manager would receive y 0 . IC2 ensures that once the manager has learned = s, the manager prefers to claim the tax bene…t. IC3 ensures that once the manager has learned = w, the manager prefers to not claim the tax bene…t. Finally, IC4 ensures that once the manager has learned = z, the manager prefers to not claim the tax bene…t. A solution to this problem is presented in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
The following contract is optimal for a conservative …rm:
The expected cost of compensation is c.
Substituting the values of y 0 ; y 1 ; and y m into the constraints show that all the constraints are satis…ed. The P C, IC1, and IC3 constraints bind; the IC2 and IC4
constraints do not bind. The fact that the expected cost is c is su¢ cient to show that the contract is optimal, because the expected cost must be at least c to satisfy the P C constraint.
The three salary payments can be ordered, y 1 < y 0 < y m : We interpret the payments as a contract with a reward for taking tax-saving reporting positions that reduce, at least in part, book tax expense, combined with a penalty for generating an unrecognized tax bene…t on the balance sheet without any corresponding reduction in book tax expense. The payments that involve the reduction of current cash taxes paid, y 1 and y m ; are the lowest and highest payments; the outcome in which current cash taxes paid are not reduced is associated with a payment between these two extremes.
Some intuition for the bonus and penalty aspects of the optimal contract becomes clear in the special case in which " = 0. In that case, a claimed tax bene…t that increases accounting earnings is a perfect signal regarding the manager's action; it could only have arisen if the tax manager had worked hard and made the tax planning decision that the …rm prefers. The penalty portion is then zero and the reward for claiming the high tax bene…t when it also increases accounting earnings is c , the cost of e¤ort divided by the probability of increasing accounting earnings, given high e¤ort.
When " > 0, both the penalty for generating an entirely unrecognized tax bene…t and the reward for generating a recognized tax bene…t increase, as the recognized tax bene…t becomes a less precise signal regarding the manager's action.
The manager receives a lower salary for claiming a tax bene…t that does not increase …nancial accounting earnings than for not claiming a tax bene…t in the …rst place. This is necessary to satisfy the IC3 constraint.
The optimal contract o¤ered by the aggressive …rm solves the following program.
The di¤erence between this program and the preceding program is that the aggressive …rm must give the manager an incentive to take the tax reporting position when the facts are weak. A solution to this problem is presented in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The following contract is optimal for an aggressive …rm:
Substituting the values of y 0 ; y 1 ; and y m into the constraints show that all the constraints are satis…ed. The P C, IC1, and IC4 constraints bind; the IC2 and IC3
We note that the penalty for claiming a tax bene…t that generates no reduction in book tax expense, y 1 ; is larger in the contract in Proposition 1 than in the contract in Proposition 2. The aggressive …rm can have a smaller penalty in its optimal contract because it only wants to deter the manager from taking aggressive tax positions that have zero support, whereas the conservative …rm wants to deter the manager from taking aggressive tax positions unless they have strong support.
Finally, we note that the solutions we present in Propositions 1 and 2 are not unique. In particular, the contract in Proposition 1 is also a solution to the aggressive …rm's contracting problem; in contrast, the contract in Proposition 2 is not a solution to the conservative …rm's contracting problem. The reason is that for the aggressive …rm, if either IC3 or IC4 bind, the other constraint is automatically satis…ed. In contrast, satisfying IC3 for the conservative …rm automatically satis…es IC4; but the converse does not hold.
The role of FIN 48
We conclude this section by considering the role that FIN 48 plays in the analysis. If managerial e¤ort were observable, both the principal and the manager would only care about cash taxes and e¤ort. The preference for a reduction in book tax expense arises endogenously as a solution to the optimal contracting problem. Thus, on the surface, FIN 48 plays a key role by providing a contracting variable that allows the …rm to provide the tax manager with the right incentives. Surely this overstates the e¤ect of FIN 48. Consider a pre-FIN 48 setting. The …rm always had the ability to hire an independent expert to examine the tax manager's decisions, o¤er an opinion, and compensate the manager based on the expert's opinion. However, the …rm would have had to incur an additional cost K to hire the independent expert. Under FIN 48, the auditor needs to evaluate the support for the manager's decision to ensure that the …rm is complying with generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore, the …rm receives a signal that can be used to implement the optimal contract at no incremental cost. Thus, an unintended side e¤ect of FIN 48 has been to reduce the cost of implementing the optimal contract.
In this section, we examine the properties of accounting measures that arise in our setting and ask how sensitive these measures as to whether a …rm is conservative or aggressive. We determine the probability that an aggressive …rm has a greater reduction in cash taxes paid (CTP), a greater reduction in book tax expense (BTE), and a greater increase in unrecognized tax bene…t (UTB) than a conservative …rm. We then rank these three measures in terms of their sensitivity to a …rm's type.
The analysis in Sections 2 and 3 was based on the tax manager having the ability to discover one tax-saving opportunity. In this section, we assume that the tax manager has n such opportunities during the year, where n is a known large number.
As before, each opportunity can have three outcomes that the manager can observe-strong support ( = s), weak support ( = w), and zero support ( = z)-and two …nancial reporting outcomes that the manager cannot observe-a favorable ( = F ) outcome that subsequently reduces book tax expense, and an unfavorable ( = U ) outcome in which book tax expense is una¤ected.
As in Section 3, we normalize the dollar value of each opportunity to one.
Therefore, for any given tax reporting opportunity, there are …ve possible outcomes, depending on the strength of the position ( 2 fs; w; zg) and the …nancial accounting treatment ( 2 fF; U g). Recall from Table 1 that = s implies = F . Table 2 summarizes the probability of each outcome and the corresponding values of the three accounting measures for the two types of …rms, where the subscript A refers to an aggressive …rm and C to a conservative …rm. Table 2   Table 2 re ‡ects the result of a single tax reporting opportunity for the three measures. Because each …rm faces a large number of opportunities, n, the aggregate value of a measure over all the tax reporting opportunities approximately has a normal distribution, with mean and variance depending on the measure and on the type of …rm. Speci…cally, let us denote M 2 fBT E; CT P; U T Bg for a measure, and i 2 fA; Cg for a type of …rm. Moreover, for any given M and i, we let M i (j; k) denote the outcome of measure M for a type i …rm in case outcome ( ; ) = (j; k)
realizes. Then the mean and variance of the corresponding distribution are given by:
for i 2 fA; Cg. These means and variances are given in the Appendix.
We measure the quality of a tax aggressiveness measure by the probability that the measure yields a higher outcome for aggressive …rms than for conservative …rms,
i.e., by
A measure is of higher quality if this probability is higher. In order to determine the quality of a measure, we therefore …rst determine, for each measure, the probability distribution of the di¤erence M A M C between the measure for an aggressive …rm and for a conservative …rm. Because all …rms face independent opportunities, the di¤erence
. These means and variances for the three measures are given in the following table. Table 3 The sensitivity of measure M is then given by:
where Z is a standard normal random variable. This implies that a measure is of higher sensitivity if and only if it has a higher value for
Comparing the measures
The following proposition shows how the sensitivity to tax aggressiveness of CT P , U T B, and BT E depends on audit quality as measured by the probability " that the …nancial reporting of tax reporting positions with weak facts is in accordance with FIN48. A higher value of " represents higher audit quality.
Proposition 3 Audit quality (") a¤ects the sensitivity of tax aggressiveness measures in the following way:
(i) CT P is more sensitive to tax aggressiveness than BT E, i.e., S(CT P ) > S(BT E)
for all ".
(ii) There exist critical values 0 < " 1 " 2 such that (a) if " < " 1 , then U T B is more sensitive than CT P , so that
S(U T B) > S(CT P ) > S(BT E);
(b) if " 1 < " < " 2 , then U T B is more sensitive than BT E but less sensitive than CT P , so that S(CT P ) > S(U T B) > S(BT E);
(c) if " > " 2 , then U T B is less sensitive than BT E, so that
S(CT P ) > S(BT E) > S(U T B):
First, Proposition 3 shows that CT P is always a more sensitive measure of tax aggressiveness than BT E. The intuition is that what distinguishes aggressive …rms from conservative …rms is that they will also take positions with weak support.
Although taking a position with weak support always leads to an increase in CT P , it only leads to a reduction in BT E in case the transaction is not recorded in accordance with FIN 48.
Next, the relative sensitivities of CT P and U T B can be expressed in terms of ", the probability that the accounting system incorrectly fails to record an unrecognized tax bene…t for the full amount of the bene…t claimed when the support for the position is weak. Perfect audit quality (" = 0) guarantees that S(U T B) > S(CT P ) > S(U T B).
When audit quality is imperfect (" > 0), which measure is more sensitive depends on two e¤ects. First, for any given two transactions faced by an aggressive …rm and a conservative …rm, respectively, audit quality a¤ects the likelihood that the e¤ect on U T B (resp., BT E) will be larger for the aggressive …rm than for the conservative …rm.
Speci…cally, it can be veri…ed that:
Thus, the probability that the increase in U T B is higher for the aggressive …rm than for the conservative …rm is larger than the probability that the decrease in CT P is higher for the aggressive …rm than for the conservative …rm, which in turn is larger than the probability that decrease in BT E is higher for the aggressive …rm than for the conservative …rm. Second, audit quality also a¤ects noise in the size of the di¤erence between the two types, conditional on two independent tax reporting opportunities yielding a higher value for the aggressive …rm than for the conservative …rm. Whereas the di¤erence is always 1 for CT P , and always m for BT E, it is sometimes 1 and sometimes 1 m for U T B. Thus U T B in a sense is more noisy.
Because this e¤ect becomes weaker when m is lower, a lower value of m makes it more likely that U T B is the most sensitive measure, and less likely that U T B is the least sensitive measure. As can be seen from the Proof of Proposition 3, the critical values of ", are both decreasing in m.
Prior tax research has clearly established the importance of …nancial reporting e¤ects of tax reporting decisions. This study shows that a compensation system that rewards tax managers for tax reporting positions that decrease book tax expense and punishes tax managers for claiming tax bene…ts that generate unrecognized tax bene…ts provides incentives for a tax manager to work hard to identify and evaluate tax-saving reporting positions, while at the same time refraining from taking positions that would increase the …rm's expected tax costs due to the possibility of future audits and penalties. Therefore, a focus on the …nancial reporting consequences of tax reporting decisions arises endogenously in a setting in which all parties just care about current and future taxes and e¤ort costs.
We investigate …nancial accounting measures of tax reporting decisions to evaluate the sensitivity of these measures regarding whether a …rm is aggressive or conservative. We examine three measures-reduction in current cash taxes paid, reduction in book tax expense, and the increase in the unrecognized tax bene…t. We …nd that when …nancial reporting quality is su¢ ciently high, the increase in unrecognized tax bene…t is the most sensitive measure; when …nancial reporting quality is su¢ ciently low, the increase in unrecognized tax bene…t is the least sensitive measure. Current taxes paid is always more sensitive than book tax expense.
Appendix
The following table presents the means of the three measures for the two types of …rms. Proof of Proposition 3.
Measure
(i) CT P is more sensitive than BT E if and only if S(CT P ) is greater than S(BT E).
Using Table 3 and (7), we …nd that: (ii) First, we compare the sensitivity of U T B and CT E. Using Table 3 and (7), we …nd that The sign of (8) 
S(U T B) S(CT E)
Using ! = 1 , it can be veri…ed that Next, we compare the sensitivity of U T B and BT E. Using Table 3 and (7) 
The expression in (11) is positive when " = 0 and is strictly concave in ", with a unique global maximum. Therefore, there exists an " 2 > 0 such that (11) is strictly positive for all " < " 2 and strictly negative for all " > " 2 . Finally, it follows from part (i) that " 1 " 2 .
